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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Decree of Divorce forming the basis for this appeal 
was entered May 12, 1987, in the Sixth Judicial District Court 
of the State of Utah and constitutes a final judgment as that 
term is defined in Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
A Notice of appeal meeting the requirements of Rule 3 of 
the Rules of the Court of Appeals was timely filed within the 
time allowed by Rule 4, and all the required fees have been 
paid. 
Jurisdiction is conferred under the provisions of 
§78-2(a)-3(g) and §30-3-7 Utah Code Annotated (1953 as Amended). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Donald Lloyd Jefferies is the father of Joycelyn Jefferies, 
age 37. Eva Louise Jefferies is her mother. Mr. Jefferies 
files this appeal seeking review of the child support pro-
visions of a Decree of Divorce which dissolved the marriage 
between the parties to this action and awarded a contract 
receivable directly to the child. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The following issues are presented for review: 
1. Does the Trial court have jurisdiction to remove 
ownership of a marital asset from litigating parties in a 
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Contract and giving it directly to an adult daughter whom the 
Court found to be incompetent to care for herself. 
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL 
The case was tried to the court on April 23, 1987. Mrs. 
Jefferies presented evidence that the child was incompetent 
and argued that certain of the parties accumulated assets 
should be distributed to that daughter, (Transcript, p. 59). 
Mr. Jefferies is before this Court questioning the jurisdiction 
of the Trial Court to do that. He is not challenging his 
responsibilities to support the child if the Trial Court's 
determination that she is incompetent is upheld. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 12, 1987, the Court referred to above granted Eva 
Louise Jefferies a Decree of Divorce (Transcript, p. 116), 
which became final on that date. At that time property was 
divided and debts disposed of. In so doing, the Court 
provided for the support of Joycelyn Jefferies, a daughter 
of the litigating parties, who was at that time 37 years old, 
(Transcript, p. 117), whom the Court found incompetent to 
care for herself by awarding to her all payments receivable 
under a Uniform Real Estate Contract owned by the parties 
and payable each month in the amount of $1385.00 for the next 
28.9 years. Mr. Jefferies files this appeal from those findings 
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and that portion of the decree distributing the contract to 
Joycelyn directly. 
Mr. and Mrs. Jefferies were married on January 16, 1943, 
at Evanston, Wyoming, and were until the time of this divorce 
husband and wife. There were four children born as issue of the 
marriage, none of whom were minors on the date of the Decree 
of Divorce, (Transcript, p. 4-5). One of these children, 
Joycelyn Jefferies, is presently 37 years of age. Although 
Joycelyn has been intermittently employed for short periods of 
time, she has been supported for the most part by her parents 
all of her life, (Transcript, p. 59-60). 
At one time the parties owned the El Rancho Motel 
located at 1105 South State Street in Provo, Utah. The 
parties sold it to William Reed Esplin and Paula M. Esplin 
by Warranty Deed on August 10, 1986. (R 29). The parties 
entered into a Uniform Real Estate Contract dated August 10, 
1976, as sellers, with William Reed Esplin and Paula M. Esplin 
as buyers. Under the terms of the contract, there was approxi-
mately $178,655 due and payable to the parties at the time of 
the divorce decree at a rate of $1385.00 per month, and which 
contract accrues interest at a rate of 8.57o. (R 29). The 
Trial Court found that the contract receivable should be awarded 
to the child, Joycelyn as her sole and separate property. (R 28). 
The Court emphasized that it was necessary to make a provision 
for the support of this child, even though she was no longer a 
minor, because of the belief that if the Court did not make such 
a provision, that the child would eventually become a ward of 
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the State. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mr. Jefferies makes this appeal asserting that the Trial 
Court erred in making an arbitrary determination of the amount 
of child support awarded as well as the source from which the 
support will be derived, namely the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract. Specifically, the Court appears to have failed to 
take into consideration the provisions of §78-45-1 of the 
Utah Code which provides the relevant factors that must be con-
sidered by a Court in making an award for child support. It 
does not appear from the record that the Court had any signi-
ficant evidence before it as to what Joycelynfs needs actually 
amounted to. (R 34). 
Secondly, by awarding to the daughter the Real Estate Contract, 
the Court has created an inflexible system for support that 
will be more than adequate now, but less than adequate in the 
future, or it may not be needed in the future at all. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
It is the position of the appellant that the Trial Court 
incorrectly determined the amount of child support awarded for 
the benefit of the parties' adult daughter because of the 
Court's failure to consider and apply the relevant factors 
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necessary in determining prospective support, which are set 
forth in §78-45-7 Utah Code Annotated (1953 as Amended). 
In questioning the Trial Court's holding, the appellant does 
not contend that he does not have a responsibility for the 
continuing support of Joycelyn as long as she needs it. In 
addition to the natural desire as her father to aid in her 
support, Mr. Jefferies is mindful of the fact the Utah Code 
§78-45-3 requires that f,every man shall support his child...ff 
The fact that Joycelyn has reached the age of majority appears 
to be irrelevant to the issue of support considering that 
§78-45-2(4) of the Code defines child as ,f. . . a son or 
daughter under the age of 18 and a son or daughter of any age 
who is incapacitated from earning a living and without sufficient 
means.11 This statute is supported by Garrand v. Garrand, 615 
P.2d 422, (Utah 1980), which held that the Trial Court properly 
required the defendant husband to pay child support after the 
child had reached 21 years of age where tfte child was retarded 
and incapable of self support. 
Appellant's contention, however, is that the amount of 
support was determined arbitrarily and without regard to the 
provisions of §78-45-7 of the Utah Code, which particularly 
defines the elements that are to be considered in making such 
a determination. Pursuant to the statute referred to, the 
Court must consider: 
"(a) The standard of living and situation of the 
parties; 
(b) The relative wealth and income of the parties; 
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(c) The ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) The ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) The need of the obligee; 
(f) The responsibility of the obligor for the 
support of others." 
This is by no means an exhaustive list of elements which 
might be considered; however, it is Mr. Jefferies contention 
that the Trial Court considered only a few of the statutory 
elements listed above. Bernard v. Attebury, 629 P.2d 892 at 
894 and 895 (Utah, 1981) is a case which examines the precise 
issue of how a Trial Court should go about determining the 
appropriate amount of child support. In that case, the 
Supreme Court held that it would not disturb the Trial Court's 
exercise of discretion unless it is shown that the Trial Court 
failed to apply the relevant factors including, but limited to, 
those found in §78-45-7. 
"This Court will not disturb the Trial Court's 
exercise of discretion unless we form a definite and 
firm conviction that the Court below committed a 
cl^ar error of judgment in the conclusion it reached 
upon a weighing of the relevant factors.11 
In the transcript of the proceedings at page 60 and fol-
lowing, there is some testimony by Mrs. Jefferies regarding 
Joycelyn's ability to maintain employment. 
"Q. Now, as it relates to her ability to support 
herself, does she have the ability to stay 
employed. 
A. No. 
Q. What happens when she gets employed? 
A. Well, when she gets employed, the last employment 
she had she lived --
Q. How long ago, by the way? 
A. That's only been about a year ago, and she had 
five different homes that she was a nanny in six 
months because she couldn't, she just couldn't do 
the work. She'd get emotionally upset. 
Q. As a nanny, did she have the responsibility with 
the children and with keeping the house up? 
A. Yes. And she just couldn't do any more." 
The above testimony is fairly all that was contained in the 
proceeding with regard to the elements which must be considered. 
At the same time, this testimony is not evidence that Joycelyn 
is unemployable in some other type of work which might not require 
higher mental and emotional capacity, nor does it indicate that 
her capacity will not improve at some tim6 in the future. The 
Court made no findings as to the standard of living of the 
parties; relative wealth and income, and ability of the parents 
to earn; the overall needs of Joycelyn; her capacity to earn, 
even if not as a nanny or in other related work; her age and 
life expectancy; the age of Mr. Jefferies; his obligation to 
support others; and the fact that Mr. Jefferies had relied on^this 
contract as his retirement. 
The Court, in awarding support to Joycelyn through the 
vehicle of a contract receivable, has made a very inflexible 
decision that does not make provisions for possible changes in 
the future. This decision does not anticipate Joycelyn's 
possible improvement, nor does the decree address the possibility 
of her untimely death. In making such an unusual award for the 
support of an incapacitated adult child, Appellant urges that 
these are all things which the Court should have considered; 
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and maybe it did; but the Findings of Fact do not so indicate. 
Appellant argues that the $1,385.00 per month provided by 
the contract is an arbitrary and excessive amount to award to 
Joycelyn absent any kind of a showing of special need and 
absent evidence that she cannot work and will never be able 
to care for, herself. In Roberts v. Roberts, 592 P.2d 597, at 
599, (Utah, 1979), the Supreme Court found it a denial of due 
process to the obligor spouse for the Court to assess the obligor 
for public assistance benefits in the nature of child support 
obtained by obligee without considering the relevant factors 
such as relative wealth and income of all parties; and the 
ability of the parties to earn income. See also Mecham v. 
Mecham, 570 P.2d 123, (Utah, 1977). 
Based on the language used by the Court in making the Order 
and Ruling (Transcript p. 117), it appears that the Court 
worried somewhat over the welfare of the child but only to the 
extent that it hoped to prevent the child from becoming a ward 
of the State of Utah. While this is certainly an understandable 
concern, Appellant believes that his statutory right to due process 
of law was forgotten. In light of the circumstances, and the clear 
intent of both parties to see that their daughter will be taken 
care of even when they are no longer available to care for her, 
this arbitrary award by the Trial Court was truly excessive. 
POINT II 
As has been previously said, there is no question about the 
responsibility of both of the parties to this action to provide 
ongoing support for the maintenance of their daughter, regard-
less of her age, if she is incapacitated as the Trial Court 
found. The only finding of fact made by the Court, however, 
is to the effect that the parents have been supporting her for 
her entire life, and that if support is not ongoing, she may 
some day become a ward of the state (Transcript, page 117). 
The finding that is challenged, however, is that it is necessary 
to remove the major asset from the marital property accumulated by 
these parties over the course of a forty-four-year marriage 
and give it directly to one of their children, regardless of 
what that child's needs may be. It is submitted that to the extent 
that the Court did in fact do that, (Transcript, p. 117, line 21), 
it exceeded the authority granted to the Court under the Uniform 
Civil Liability for Support Act, §78-45-1 through §78-45-7, Utah 
Code Annotated (1953 as Amended). 
The question of whether or not the Court has the jurisdiction 
to take marital property from divorce litigants and give it 
directly to a dependent appears to be one of first impression 
in this State. An argument can be made that this should be the 
law, but the legislature of the State of Utah has not seen fit to 
go that far under the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act 
cited above. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, it is respectfully requested 
that Findings No. 6 & 7 of the Trial Court's Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, (R 28), and Finding No. 2 of the 
1 T 
Decree of Divorce, (R 29), should be reversed and the matter 
remanded to the Trial Court for further findings and an appro-
priate order of support and disposition of the future contract 
proceeds in order for the issue of support for Joycelyn to be 
properly re-evaluated pursuant to the applicable statutes. 
Respectfully submitted this 28th day of August, 1987. 
Noall T. Wootton 
Attorney for Appellant 
Donald Lloyd Jefferies 
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UNIFORM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT ACT 78-45-2 
78-45-1. Short title. 
This act may be cited as the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act. 
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 1. Cross-References. — Child support collec-
Meaning of "this act". — The term "[t]his tion, Chapter 45d of this title. 
act," referred to in this section, means Laws Public support of children, Chapter 45b of 
1957, Chapter 110, which appears as this title. 
§§ 78-45-1 to 78-45-4, 78-45-5 to 78-45-7, Uniform child custody jurisdiction, Chapter 
78-45-8, 78-45-9, and 78-45-10 to 78-45-13. 45c of this title. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Postmajority disability as reviving tute parent's support obligation after terms of 
parental duty to support child, 48 A.L.R.4th pnor decree have been fulfilled, 48 A.L.R.4th 
919. 953. 
Child support: court's authority to remsti-
78-45-2. Definitions. 
As used in this act: 
(1) "State" includes any state, territory or possession of the United 
States, the District of Columbia and the commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 
(2) "Obligor" means any person owing a duty of support. 
(3) "Obligee" means any person to whom a duty of support is owed. 
(4) "Child" means a son or daughter under the age of 18 years and a 
son or daughter of whatever age who is incapacitated from earning a 
living and without sufficient means. 
(5) "Parent" includes a natural parent, an adoptive parent, or a step-
parent. 
(6) "Stepparent" means a person ceremonially married to a child's nat-
ural or adoptive custodial parent who is not the child's natural or adop-
tive parent or one living with the natural or adoptive parent as a common 
law spouse, whose common law marriage was entered into in a state 
which recognizes the validity of common law marriages. 
(7) "Stepchild" means any child with a stepparent. 
(8) "Earnings" means compensation paid or payable for personal ser-
vices, whether denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus, or oth-
erwise, and specifically include periodic payment pursuant to pension or 
retirement programs, or insurance policies of any type. Earnings shall 
specifically include all gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both 
combined, including profit gained through sale or conversion of capital 
assets. 
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 2; 1979, ch. Cross-References. — Adoption, Chapter 30 
131, § 1; 1982, ch. 63, § 1. of this title. 
Meaning of "this act". — See note under 
same catchline following § 78-45-1. 
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78-45-3 JUDICIAL CODE 
78-45-3. Duty of man. 
Every man shall support his child; and he shall support his wife when she is 
in need. 
History; L. 1957, ch. 110, § 3; 1977, ch. Divorce, maintenance of parties, § 30-3-5. 
140, § 3. Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support 
Cross-References. — Criminal nonsupport Act, § 77-31-1 et seq. 
of children, § 76-7-201. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Child's right to support. 
Duty to support children. 
—Judicial limitation. 
—Retarded child. 
—Transfer. 
Duty to support wife. 
—Termination. 
Divorce. 
Estoppel to assert duty to support. 
Wrongful death action. 
—Medical and burial expenses. 
Child's right to support. 
A child's right to support is his own right, 
not his parent's. Wasescha v. Wasescha, 548 
P.2d 895 (Utah 1976). 
Duty to support children. 
—Judicial limitation. 
Parents are permanently "duty-bound" to 
support their children; however, the extent of 
that duty is not without limitation, and where 
the question of child support has been submit-
ted to a court of competent jurisdiction and a 
ruling thereon has been obtained, the more 
general statutory duty of support becomes cir-
cumscribed by the more specific duty imposed 
by the court. In re C.J.U., 660 P.2d 237 (Utah 
1983). 
—Retarded child. 
Trial court properly required husband to pay 
child support after the child reached 21 years 
of age where the child was retarded and inca-
pable of self-support. Garrand v. Garrand, 615 
P.2d 422 (Utah 1980). 
—Transfer. 
A parent cannot rid himself of his duty to 
support his children by purporting to transfer 
this duty to someone else by contract. Gulley v. 
Gulley, 570 P.2d 127 (Utah 1977). 
Duty to support wife. 
—Termination. 
Divorce. 
Divorce terminates husband's duty to sup-
port his wife except for any obligations im-
posed by the divorce decree. Gulley v. Gulley, 
570 P.2d 127 (Utah 1977). 
Estoppel to assert duty to support. 
Children have a right to support, but where 
their mother and her second husband had pro-
vided it, mother was estopped to demand that 
her first husband also contribute support; since 
her demand was not in the nature of a claim 
for reimbursement, to grant it would have been 
in effect to give the children "double support" 
to which they were not entitled. Wasescha v. 
Wasescha, 548 P.2d 895 (Utah 1976). 
Wrongful death action. 
—Medical and burial expenses. 
District court erred in deducting proceeds of 
medical and burial insurance policy from 
amount of special damages in action by father 
for wrongful death of son, since father was un-
der legal duty imposed by statute to pay cost of 
medical care and burial expenses for son and 
was thus entitled to recover amounts reason-
ably expended for that purpose; mere fact that 
plaintiff at own expense carried insurance to 
protect against such contingencies should not 
inure to benefit of wrongdoer. Ottley v. Hillt 21 
Utah 2d 396, 446 P.2d 301 (1968). 
638 
UNIFORM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT ACT 78-45-4 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 41 Am. Jur. 2d Husband 
and Wife § 329 et seq.; 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parent 
and Child § 54. 
C.J.S. — 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 15; 
67A C.J.S. Parent and Child §§ 55 to 58. 
A.L.R. — Death of putative father as pre-
cluding action! for determination of paternity 
or for child support, 58 A.L.R.3d 188. 
Liability of barent for support of child insti-
tutionalized b^ juvenile court, 59 A.L.R.3d 636. 
Key Numbers. — Husband and Wife <*=* 4; 
Parent and Child «=> 3.1(2). 
78-45-4, Duty of woman. 
Every woman shall support her child; and she shall support her husband 
when he is in need. 
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 4. 
Cross-References. — Criminal nonsupport 
of children, § 76-7-201. 
Divorce, maintenance of parties, § 30-3-5. 
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support 
Act, § 77-31-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Duty to support children. 
—Judicial limitation. 
—Transfer. 
—Termination. 
Divorce. 
Duty to support children. 
—Judicial limitation. 
Parents are "duty-bound" to support their 
children; however, the extent of that duty is 
not without limitation, and where the question 
of child support has been submitted to a court 
of competent jurisdiction and a ruling thereon 
has been obtained, the more general statutory 
duty of support becomes circumscribed by the 
more specific duty imposed by the court. In re 
C.J.U., 660 P.2d 237 (Utah 1983). 
—Transfer. 
A parent cannot rid herself of her duty to 
support her children by purporting to transfer 
this duty to someone else by contract. Gulley v. 
Gulley, 570 P.2d 127 (Utah 1977). 
—Termination. 
Divorce. 
The fact that the wife in a divorce proceeding 
is not required to pay support, neither termi-
nates the children's right, nor obviates the 
mother's responsibility, for such support as 
may be determinedat some future time. Wood-
ward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d 393 (Utah 1985). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 41 Am. Jur. 2d Husband 
and Wife § 334; 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parent and 
Child § 54. 
C.J.S. — 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 16; 
67A CJ.S. Parent and Child § 54. 
A.L.R. — Liability of parent for support of 
child institutionalized by juvenile court, 59 
A.L.R.3d 636. 
Wife's possession of independent means as 
affecting her right to child support pendente 
lite, 60 A.L.R.3d 832. 
Key Numbers. — Husband and Wife <*=» 4; 
Parent and Child «= 3.1(3). 
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UNIFORM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT ACT 78-45-7 
78-45-4,3. Ward of state — Primary obligation to support. 
Notwithstanding § 78-45-2, a natural or an adoptive parent or stepparent 
whose minor child has become a ward of the state is not relieved of the pri-
mary obligation to support that child until he reaches the age of majority. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-4.3, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Adoption, Chapter 30 
1983, ch. 120, § 1. of this title. 
Period of minority, § 15-2-1. 
78-45-5. Duty of obligor regardless of presence or resi-
dence of obligee. 
An obligor present or resident in this state has the duty of support as 
defined in this act regardless of the presence or residence of the obligee. 
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 5. 
Meaning of "this act". — See note under 
same catchline following § 78-45-1. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur . 2d. — 23 Am. Jur. 2d Desertion Key Numbers. — Husband and Wife «=> 4; 
and Nonsupport §§ 32, 95. Parent and Child «=» 3.1(5). 
C.J.S. — 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 14 
et seq. 
78-45-6. District court jurisdiction. 
The district court shall have jurisdiction of all proceedings brought under 
this act. 
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 6. Meaning of "this act". — See note under 
Cross-References. — General jurisdiction same catchline following § 78-45-1. 
of district court, § 78-3-4. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur . 2d. —20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 147 C.J.S. — 21 C.J.S. Courts, § 291. 
et seq. Key Numbers. — Courts «=* 156. 
78-45-7. Determination of amount of support — Assess-
ment formula for temporary support. 
(1) Prospective support shall be equal to the amount granted by prior court 
order unless there has been a material change of circumstance on the part of 
the obligor or obligee. 
(2) When no prior court order exists, or a material change in circumstances 
has occurred, the court, in determining the amount of prospective support, 
shall consider all relevant factors including but not limited to: 
(a) the standard of living and situation of the parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
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(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) the need of the obligee; 
(f) the age of the parties; 
(g) the responsibility of the obligor foif the support of others. 
(3) When no prior court order exists, the cotirt shall determine and assess 
all arrearages based upon, but not limited to: 
(a) the amount of public assistance received by the obligee, if any; 
(b) the funds that have been reasonably and necessarily expended in 
support of spouse and children. 
(4) In determining the amount of prospective support on an ex parte or 
other motion for temporary support, the court shall use a uniform statewide 
assessment formula, adjusted for regional differences, prior to rendering the 
support order. The formula shall provide for all relevant factors which can be 
readily identified and shall allow for reasonable deductions from the obligor's 
earnings for taxes, work related expenses, and living expenses. The assess-
ment formula shall be established by the Department of Social Services and 
periodically reviewed by the Judicial Council, under Subsection 78-3-21(3). 
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 7; 1977, ch. 
145, § 10; 1984, ch. 13, § 2. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1984 amend-
ment added Subsection (4); and made minor 
changes m style. 
Cross-References. — Creation of Depart-
ment of Social Services, § 63-35-3. 
Creation of Judicial Council, Utah Const., 
Art. VIII, Sec. 12; § 78-3-21. 
Divorce, maintenance of parties, § 30-3-5. 
Public support of children, Chapter 45b of 
this titlel 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Assessment of arrearages 
—Due process requirements. 
Modification of support. 
—Divorce decree. 
State recovery of assistance to child. 
Assessment of arrearages. 
—Due process requirements. 
Due process of law requires that court must 
consider the relevant factors set out in this sec-
tion in assessment of obligor for public assis-
tance benefits received by the obligee prior to a 
court order for support. Roberts v. Roberts, 592 
P.2d 597 (Utah 1979). 
Modification of support. 
—Divorce decree. 
The divorce decree establishes the duty of 
support the ex-husband owes to his ex-wife and 
a complaint under this section to modify that 
duty of support is improper. Mecham v. 
Mecham, 570 P.2d 123 (Utah 1977). 
State recovery of assistance to child. 
State, which was joined as a party to the di-
vorce action before court entered order deter-
mining husband's obligation for child support, 
was entitled to reimbursement from the hus-
band for assistance furnished the child before 
entry of the order for support in the amount, 
based upon the relevant factors as set out in 
this section, as set out in the support order. 
Roberts v. Roberts, 592 P.2d 597 (Utah 1979). 
642 
UNIFORM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT ACT 78-45-9 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. —- 41 Am. Jur. 2d Husband C.J.S. — 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 14 
and Wife § 330 et seq.; 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parent et seq.; 67A C.J.S. Parent and Child § 50. 
and Child § 54 et seq. Key Numbers. — Husband and Wife <s= 4; 
Parent and Child «=» 3.1(5). 
78-45-7.1. Medical and dental expenses of dependent chil-
dren — Assigning responsibility for payment — 
Insurance coverage. 
When no prior court order exists or the prior court order makes no specific 
provision for the payment of medical and dental expenses for dependent chil-
dren, the court shall include in its order a provision assigning responsibility 
for the payment of reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses for 
the dependent children. If coverage is available at a reasonable cost, the court 
may also include a provision requiring the purchase and maintenance of ap-
propriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for those children. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.1, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Divorce, maintenance 
1984, ch. 13, § 3. and health care of parties, § 30-3-5. 
78-45-8. Continuing jurisdiction. 
The court shall retain jurisdiction to modify or vacate the order of support 
where justice requires. 
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 8. 
Cross-References. — General jurisdiction 
of district court, § 78-3-4. 
78-45-9. Enforcement of right of support. 
(1) The obligee may enforce his right of support against the obligor and the 
state Department of Social Services may proceed pursuant to this act or any 
other applicable statute, either on its own behalf or on behalf of the obligee, to 
enforce the obligee's right of support against the obligor. Whenever any court 
action is commenced by the state Department of Social Services to enforce 
payment of the obligor's support obligation, it shall be the duty of the attorney 
general or the county attorney, of the county of residence of the obligee, to 
represent that department. 
(2) No obligee shall commence any action to recover support due or owing 
that obligee whether under this act or any other applicable statute without 
first filing an affidavit with the court at the time the action is commenced 
stating whether that obligee has received public assistance from any source. If 
the obligee has received public assistance, the obligee shall join the Depart-
ment of Social Services as a party plaintiff in the action. The Department of 
Social Services shall be represented as provided in Subsection (1) of this sec-
tion. 
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Frances E. BERNARD, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
John W. ATTEBURY, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 16985. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 9, 1981. 
Father appealed from that portion of 
consolidated order of the Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Raymond S. Uno, 
J. Pro Tern, which required him to pay 
$2,600 to mother for child support and ar-
rearages in support payments. The Su-
preme Court, Maughan, C. J., held that: (1) 
trial court's decision to award one child 
prospective support did not constitute a 
clear error of judgment; (2) there was sub-
stantial evidence to support trial court's 
finding that one child was not emancipated 
from parental custody; and (3) doctrine of 
res judicata could not be invoked by father 
to foreclose consideration of mother's claim 
for past-due child support payments. 
Affirmed. 
Stewart, J., concurred in the result. 
1. Divorce <&=>2 
The Supreme Court must apply the 
laws of Utah in determining the appropri-
ateness of imposing a duty of child support. 
U.C.A.1953, 77-61a-7. 
2. Parent and Child <s=> 3.3(8) 
While child support payments become 
unalterable debts as they accrue and a peri-
odic installment cannot be changed or modi-
fied after installment has become due, trial 
court may exercise its discretion in impos-
ing a duty of support prospectively. U.C.A. 
1953, 77-^61a-24. 
3. Parent and Child <$=> 3.3(10) 
The Supreme Court will not disturb 
trial court's exercise of discretion in deter-
mining appropriateness of imposing child 
support duty unless Supreme Court forms 
ddfimte and firm conviction that court be-
low committed clear error of judgment in 
conclusion it reached upon weighing of rele-
vant factors. U.C.A.1953, 77-61a-7. 
4. Parent and Child <s=> 3.3(8) 
Decision of trial court to award one 
child prospective support, reached after 
weighing of information concerning where-
abouts and living situation of child, did not 
constitute a clear error of judgment. U.C. 
A.|l953, 77-61a-7. 
5. Parent and Child *=> 3.3(5) 
Substantial evidence supported trial 
court's decision that one child was not 
emancipated from parental custody for pur-
poses of determining child support. U.C.A. 
1953, 77-61a-7. 
6. Judgment <s=>634 
The doctrine of res judicata renders a 
final judgment, on the merits, by a court of 
competent jurisdiction, conclusive upon par-
ties and is a bar to subsequent litigation of 
same issues. 
7. Judgment <s=>650 
Before doctrine of res judicata is appli-
cable, final judgment embracing all issues 
must be entered and preliminary or interim 
rulings which do not represent final deter-
mination do not rise to dignity of res judica-
t a 
8. Judgment <s=>658 
Where previous court child support or-
der did not adjudicate claim of relief relat-
ing to one of the parties' children and mere-
ly lordered temporary child support for the 
parties' other minor child pending further 
order of court, court's decree did not fulfill 
requirements of rule governing judgment in 
case involving multiple claims for relief and 
did not constitute a final judgment; there-
fore, the doctrine of res judicata could not 
be invoked by the father to foreclose consid-
eration of the mother's claim for past-due 
payments at subsequent hearings. Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rule 54(b). 
Wendell P. Abies, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and appellant 
BERNARD v. 
Cite as, Utah, 
Sandra N. Peuler, Deputy Salt Lake 
County Atty., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff 
and respondent. 
MAUGHAN, Chief Justice: 
The defendant appeals from that portion 
of the district court's consolidated order 
which requires him to pay $2,600 to the 
plaintiff for child support and arrearages in 
his support payments. We affirm the dis-
trict court's order. All statutory references 
are to Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended. 
On September 7, 1976, the district court 
of Sweetwater County, Wyoming, issued a 
divorce decree terminating the marriage of 
the plaintiff and defendant, John W. Atte-
bury. Pursuant to this decree, the plaintiff 
was awarded custody of the couple's two 
minor children, John David and John Jo-
seph, and the defendant agreed to pay $250 
per child per month for support of those 
children. 
Following the divorce, the children lived 
with the plaintiff until October, 1977, when 
John Joseph came to Salt Lake City to live 
with the defendant. In March, 1978, John 
David joined his brother, and the defend-
ant, in Salt Lake City. Thereafter, the 
children lived with the defendant in Utah 
until December, 1978, when the plaintiff 
resumed custody of them in Salt Lake City. 
On December 9, 1978, John David and John 
Joseph returned to Green River, Wyoming, 
where they lived with friends until their 
mother joined them there on January 1, 
1979. The plaintiff and the two children 
have lived together continually in Green 
River from that time until the date of the 
original hearing in this enforcement pro-
ceeding. 
The plaintiff initiated the present pro-
ceedings on March 21, 1979, when she filed 
a petition for support under the Uniform 
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, 
77-61a-l et seq., requesting enforcement of 
the Wyoming support decree. Prior to the 
initial hearing in the matter which was held 
on May 30, 1979, the parties entered into an 
agreement stipulating to a reduction in the 
required support money from $500 per 
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month to $300, with monthly payments of 
$150 for the support of John Joseph to start 
immediately. However, because of factual 
questions concerning the possible emancipa-
tion of John David from the custody of the 
plaintiff, the agreement reserved payment 
of support for John David until that issue 
could be investigated. 
This agreement was to be incorporated 
into the court's original order following the 
May 30th hearing. However, the original 
rendition of the agreement as laid out in 
the court's order was incorrect and was 
later amended by stipulation. A corrected 
order was subsequently adopted by the dis-
trict court on June 8, 1979. In both the 
original and amended order, the defendant 
was "temporarily ordered to pay the sum of 
$150 for one child . . . for the support of 
John Joseph, beginning with June, 1979. 
Said payments shall continue each and ev-
ery month thereafter until further order of 
this court." The amendment to the order 
concerned the scope of an investigation to 
be undertaken by the Green River County 
Attorney's office for factual data relating 
to the possible emancipation of John David. 
Following a hearing on August 22, 1979, 
the district court entered a judgment and 
decree on September 5, 1979, which ordered 
the defendant to pay $150 a month for the 
support of John David for the months of 
August, September, October and November, 
1979, and thereafter cease making such 
payments because of the child's eighteenth 
birthday. This decree further ordered the 
continuation of the payments to John Jo-
seph and entered a judgment of $2,000, 
representing past due child support. After 
this hearing, a motion was submitted by the 
defendant requesting the order be amended 
to identify the portions of the $2,000 judg-
ment which were attributable to each par-
ticular child. 
At the August hearing, the defendant 
argued the judgment entered in the prior 
hearing was res judicata regarding his lia-
bility for past support payments and pre-
cluded a new judgment granting arrearag-
es. The court expressly refused to rule on 
this issue but advised the defendant he 
could present it at future proceedings. 
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Following a hearing on the defendant's 
motion to amend the order of September 5, 
1979, the court denied the defendant's mo-
tion to set aside that judgment. 
Finally, another hearing was held and a 
consolidated judgment entered on February 
22, 1980, merging all previous orders and 
judgments. This consolidated order de-
creed that the defendant pay $150 per 
month to John Joseph, commencing on June 
1, 1979. The decree also ordered the de-
fendant to pay a total amount of $600 for 
the support of John David from August 1, 
1979 through November 30, 1979. The or-
der upheld the previous judgment granting 
the plaintiff $2,000 in arrearages divided 
equally between the children which repre-
sented unfulfilled payments due and owing 
from February through May of 1979. The 
order waived support payments for John 
David for the months of June and July of 
1979 because of his employment during 
those months and arranged for payment of 
the $2,600 by installments which would run 
concurrently with the support payments for 
John Joseph. 
The district court's consolidated order 
went on the declare: 
" . . . [t]hat the defense of res judicata, 
specifically that the order of May 31, [sic] 
(30), 1979, was res judicata as to the 
arrearages awarded in the Judgment and 
Order of September 5, 1979, be and the 
same is hereby determined to be not es-
tablished." 
The defendant's principal contentions on 
appeal are: (1) the trial court abused its 
discretion in ordering support for John 
David; (2) John David is not entitled to 
support because he was emancipated from 
his mother's custody during the time in 
question; and (3) the order of May 30,1979, 
is res judicata and forecloses the considera-
tion of past due support payments at subse-
quent hearings. 
1. See Lamberth v. Lamberth, Utah, 550 P.2d 
200 (1976). 
2. Larsen v. Larsen, Utah, 561 P.2d 1077, 1079 
(1977) 
[1,2] Turning to the first contention, 
i/e are reminded of the fact that pursuant o 77-61a-7, this court must apply the laws f Utah in determining the appropriateness 
4f imposing a duty of support.1 Thus, while 
support payments become unalterable debts 
ais they accrue and a periodic installment 
cannot be changed or modified after the 
installment has become due,2 the trial court 
nfray exercise its discretion in imposing a 
duty of support prospectively.3 
In determining the appropriateness of im-
posing a support duty, 78-45-7 outlines a 
number of relevant factors which the court 
must consider in exercising its discretion. 
Specifically, 78-45-7 provides: 
"(1) Prospective support shall be equal 
to the amount granted by the prior court 
order unless there has been a material 
change of circumstances on the part of 
the obligor or obligee. 
"(2) When no prior court order exists, 
br a material change in circumstances has 
occurred, the court in determining the 
amount of prospective support shall con-
sider all relevant factors including, but 
not limited to: 
"(a) the standard of living and situa-
tion of the parties; 
"(b) the relative wealth and income 
of the parties; 
"(c) the ability of the obligor to 
earn; 
"(d) the ability of the obligee to 
earn; 
"(e) the need of the obligee; 
"(f) the age of the parties; 
"(g) the responsibility of the obligor 
for the support of others." 
[3] This Court will not disturb the trial 
court's exercise of discretion unless we form 
a definite and firm conviction that the 
court below committed a clear error of 
judgment in the conclusion it reached upon 
3. $ee 77-61a-24. ["If the court of the respond-
ing state finds a duty of support, it may order 
the respondent to furnish support or reim-
bursement therefor .." (emphasis added)]; 
see also Carter v. Carter, 19 Utah 2d 183, 429 
Pjd 35 (1967). 
BERNARD v. 
Cite as, Utah, 
a weighing of the relevant factors.4 There-
fore, if the decision were on a consideration 
of the relevant factors and not based upon 
irrelevant or inappropriate considerations, 
this Court will not reverse the trial court's 
determination unless we are convinced that 
the decision amounted to a clear error of 
judgment. 
[4] In the present case, the proceedings 
were continued several times so that infor-
mation concerning the whereabouts and liv-
ing situation of John David could be as-
certained. It appears from the record the 
trial court considered the information which 
was uncovered from these investigations 
and other relevant factors in making its 
decision to award John David prospective 
support. Because the decision reached af-
ter a weighing of these factors does not 
constitute a clear error of judgment we will 
not disturb the district court's decision con-
cerning John David's right to support. 
[5] Similarly, the trial court's determi-
nation that John David was not emancipat-
ed from parental custody will not be dis-
turbed on appeal. There was substantial 
evidence presented at trial to support the 
trial court's decision concerning the emanci-
pation issue and this Court will generally 
not disturb the findings of the trial court 
when those findings are supported by sub-
stantial, credible evidence.5 
[6,7] The next contention advanced by 
the defendant is that the judgment and 
order which was entered by the court fol-
lowing the May 30, 1979, hearing is res 
4. See Anderson v. Air West, Inc., 542 F.2d 522 
(9th Cir. 1976); see also Ute-Cal Land Develop-
ment Corp. v. Sather, Utah, 605 P.2d 1240 
(1980); Terry v. Zions Cooperative Mercantile 
Institution, Utah, 605 P.2d 314 (1979). 
5. Hopkins v. Wardley Corp., Utah, 611 P.2d 
1204 (1980); R. C. Tolman Construction Com-
pany, Inc. v. Myton Water Association, Utah, 
563 P.2d 780 (1977); Town and Country Dis-
posal, Inc. v. Martin, Utah, 563 P.2d 195 (1977). 
6. Olsen v. Board of Education of the Granite 
School District, Utah, 571 P.2d 1336, 1338 
(1977). 
7. See Richardson v. Grand Central Corpora-
tion, Utah, 572 P.2d 395, 397 (1977); In re 
Town of West Jordan, 7 Utah 2d 391, 326 P.2d 
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judicata and precludes any further assess-
ment of past due support payments. In 
this jurisdiction, the doctrine of res judicata 
renders a final judgment, on the merits, by 
a court of competent jurisdiction, conclusive 
upon the parties and is a bar to subsequent 
litigation of the same issues.6 Before the 
doctrine is applicable, however, a final 
judgment embracing all the issues must be 
entered and preliminary or interim rulings 
which do not represent a final determina-
tion do not rise to the dignity of res judica-
ta.7 
In deciding whether the court's order of 
May 30 constitutes a final judgment and as 
such invokes the doctrine of res judicata we 
are guided by Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, which states: 
"When more than one claim for relief is 
presented in an action, whether as a 
claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third 
party claim, and/or when multiple parties 
are involved, the court may direct the 
entry of a final judgment as to one or 
more but fewer than all of the claims or 
parties only upon an express determina-
tion by the court that there is no just 
reason for delay and upon an express 
direction for the entry of judgment. In 
the absence of such determination and 
direction, any order or other form of deci-
sion, however designated, which adjudi-
cates fewer than all the claims or the 
rights and liabilities of fewer than all of 
the parties shall not terminate the action 
as to any of the claims or parties, and the 
105 (1958); see also C & H Construction & 
Paving Co. v. Citizens Bank, 93 N.M. 150, 597 
P.2d 1190 (1979); McAllister v. Charter First 
Mortgage, Inc., 279 Or. 279, 567 P.2d 539, 542 
(1977) ["Before res judicata applies, the prior 
lawsuit must have ended in an 'adjudication of 
issues which have culminated in a final de-
cree.' " Quoting from Huszar v. Certified Real-
ty Co., 272 Or. 517, 538 P.2d 57, 60 (1975)]; 
American Bank of Oklahoma v. Adams, Okl., 
514 P.2d 1191 (1973); Luisi Truck Lines, Inc. v. 
Washington Utilities and Transportation 
Comm., 72 Wash.2d 887, 435 P.2d 654 (1967); 
State ex rel. Adult and Family Services Divi* 
sion v. Copeland, 45 Or.App. 35, 607 P.2d 222 
(1980). 
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order or other form of decision is subject 
to revision at any time before the entry 
of judgment adjudicating all the claims 
and the rights and liabilities of all the 
parties." 
[8] Because the May 30 order did not 
adjudicate the claim of relief relating to 
John David and merely ordered temporary 
support for the couple's other minor child 
pending "further order of this court," the 
court's decree does not fulfill the require-
ments of Rule 54(b) and does not constitute 
a final judgment. Therefore, the doctrine 
of res judicata cannot be invoked by the 
defendant to foreclose consideration of the 
plaintiff's claim for past due payments at 
the subsequent hearings.8 
The other issues advanced by the defend-
ant on appeal are equally without merit and 
the district court's consolidated order is, 
therefore, affirmed. 
HALL, HOWE and OAKS, JJ., concur. 
STEWART, J., concurs in the result 
County, John F. Wahlquist, J., granting 
partial relief in response to former detain-
er's petition for writ of habeas corpus at-
tacking conditions of confinement at jail. 
The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held that: 
(1) former pretrial detainee had standing to 
sue, even though he had moved beyond 
pretrial stage; (2) inadequate space and 
other conditions inimical to maintenance of 
health of detainees raised issues of constitu-
tional dimensions concerning conditions of 
incarceration; (3) confinement of pretrial 
detainees in overcrowded area described as 
maximum security cells of county jail raised 
serious constitutional issues as to detainee's 
right of due process to be free from unduly 
harsh and rigorous treatment; (4) failure to 
provide reasonable opportunity for exercise 
also imposed harsh conditions of confine-
ment; and (5) procedures ordered by trial 
court would be continued and additional 
procedures ordered to be adopted, if at all 
practicable. 
Remanded. 
( O I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM} 
J , 
Mark WICKHAM, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
George FISHER, Weber County Sheriff, 
Defendant and Respondent 
No. 16322. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 22, 1981. 
Former pretrial detainee appealed from 
order of the Second District Court, Weber 
8. Cf. Oldroyd v. McCrea, 65 Utah 142, 235 P. 
580, 588 (1925); State v. Booth, 21 Utah 88, 59 
P. 553 (1899), In Booth we explained; " .. 
where the rights of the parties in an action, or a 
distinct and independent branch thereof, are 
determined by the court, and nothing is re-
served for future determination, except what 
1, Habeas Corpus <s=>9 
Although former detainee had moved 
beyond pretrial stage, where it was not 
possible to adjudicate legality of conditions 
complained of during period of pretrial de-
tention, conditions at county jail giving rise 
to| constitutional issues remained, and there 
was strong public interest in having legality 
of conditions settled, former pretrial detain-
ee had standing to sue to challenge condi-
tions of confinement at jail. U.S.C.A. 
Cinst Amend. 8. 
2. Action <to6, 13 
The law does not provide exemption 
from judicial scrutiny to unlawful acts 
which are likely to be repeated on ground 
that they do not fall within usual principles 
of standing and justiciability. 
may be necessary to enforce the judgment or 
decision, the judgment is final." Id., 59 P. at 
554. For a comprehensive review of early case 
law on the question of what constitutes a final 
judgment see Shurtz v. Thorley, 90 Utah 381, 
61 P.2d 1262 (1936). 
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Leonard J. GARRAND, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Josephine Olivia GARRAND, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
No. 16622. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
July 10, 1980. 
From order of the Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, Peter F. Leary, J., re-
quiring divorced husband to pay $150 per 
month for support of his retarded son after 
he became 21, husband appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Crockett, C. J., held that: (1) 
divorce decree, which required husband to 
pay support for son until he was 21, was not 
res judicata barring imposing obligation on 
husband to pay support for son beyond age 
of 21 on ground that he was retarded and 
incapable of self-support; (2) imposing such 
obligation on husband was justified, in light 
of certain statute; and (3) requiring hus-
band to pay $150 per month for support of 
retarded son was not inequitable and did 
not involve an excessive award. 
Affirmed. 
1. Divorce e=>310 
Divorce decree, which required divorc-
ed husband to pay support for son until he 
was 21, was not res judicata barring impos-
ing an obligation on husband to pay support 
for son beyond age of 21 on ground that he 
was retarded and incapable of self-support, 
in light of fact that such issue had not been 
tried or determined in the divorce proceed-
ing. U.C.A.1953, 78-45-2(4), 78-45-3, 78 
45-4. 
2. Divorce e=*310 
Requiring divorced husband to pay sup-
port for son beyond age of 21 on ground 
that he was retarded and incapable of self-
support was justified, in light of statute 
placing responsibility on parents for the 
support of a child "of whatever age" if he 
was incapacitated from earning a living and 
without sufficient means. U.C.A.1953, 78-
45-2(4), 78-45-3, 78-45-4. 
3. Appeal and Error e=>907(2) 
Where no transcript of the evidence 
before trial court had been brought to Su-
preme Court, such-Court would assume that 
the evidence supported trial court's find-
ings. 
4. Divorce c=>309.6 
In proceeding in which divorced hus-
band was ordered to pay support for retard-
ed child beyond the age of 21, requiring 
husband to pay $150 per month for support 
of such son was not inequitable and did not 
involve an excessive award, in view of fi-
nancial circumstances of the parties. U.C. 
A.1953, 78 45 2(4), 78-45 -3, 78-45-4. 
Stephen L. Johnston, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and appellant. 
Richard L. Bird, Jr., Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and respondent. 
CROCKETT, Chief Justice: 
This case is sequel to Garrand v. Gar-
rand,1 wherein we reversed that part of the 
divorce decree that terminated a support 
award for a daughter on reaching the age 
of 18. But the question involved in this 
proceeding, as to support of the son Joseph 
after he became 21, was not involved nor 
dealt with in that case. 
Thereafter, Josephine, the defendant 
herein, initiated a separate action (consoli-
dated below with a petition for modification 
of the divorce decree). She sought to re-
quire plaintiff herein, Leonard, to provide 
support for their son Joseph beyond the age 
of 21 years on the ground that the latter is 
retarded and incapable of self-support. 
The separate action is based on the provi-
sions of Chapter 45, Title 78, U.C.A. 1953, 
known as the Civil Liability for Support 
Act. Sections 3 and 4 require that the 
father and the mother support each other 
1. Utah. 581 P.2d 1012 (1978). 
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and their minor children. And Sec. 78-45-
2(4) states thereof that 
"Child" means a son or daughter under 
the age of twenty-one years and a son or 
daughter of whatever age who is incapac-
itated from earning a living and without 
sufficient means. [Emphasis added.] 
Upon appropriate hearing and considera-
tion of the matter, the trial court ordered 
the father, plaintiff Leonard, to pay $150 
per month to support his son, Joseph (no 
one questions that he is retarded and incap-
able of self-support), after he became 21. 
On appeal, the father urges: (1) that 
inasmuch as the divorce decree awarded 
support for Joseph until he was 21, that was 
res judicata on that issue; and (2) insuffici-
ency of the evidence to support the decree. 
[1] As to (1), above: The issue present-
ed and decided in the prior proceeding re-
lated to the support of the children during 
their minority. It does not appear that the 
issue, as to the obligation of the plaintiff 
Leonard to support the son Joseph after the 
latter had attained the age of 21, nor of the 
son's right to receive such support, was 
tried or determined therein. Joseph is now 
21, when it would normally be expected 
that he would have become self-supporting. 
But the fact is that he has not, and he is 
without means of support and will become 
an object of charity, or a burden on public 
welfare, unless that responsibility is placed 
upon his parents, including his father, as 
does this adjudication. 
[2] There is a firm foundation for the 
judgment of the trial court in the statute 
quoted above. It expressly fixes responsi-
bility for support of a child "of whatever 
age who is incapacitated from earning a 
living and without sufficient means" upon 
his parents. Correlated to the foregoing 
and in further support of the trial court's 
ruling, this Court has recognized that when 
a child is so limited, either physically or 
mentally, that he is unable to support him-
2. See Dehm v. Dehm, Utah, 545 P.2d 525 
(1976), and authorities therein cited. This prin-
ciple was also stated and reaffirmed in the later 
case of Carlson v. Carlson, Utah, 584 P.2d 864 
(1978). 
self when he reaches his majority, his par-
ents may be required to provide support 
beyond tfhat time.2 
[3,4] As to the plaintiffs challenge to 
the sufficiency of evidence: There has been 
no transcript of the evidence brought to 
this Couirt; and in the absence thereof we 
assume ^hat it supports the findings of the 
trial court.3 However, we make the obser-
vation that, in view of the financial circum-
stances of the parties as shown in our prior 
decision in this case, it does not appear that 
$150 per month to provide for a retarded 
child wdmld be excessive or inequitable. 
Affirmed. Costs to plaintiff. 
MAUGHAN, HALL and WILKINS, JJ., 
and HENRIOD, Retired Justice, concur. 
STEWART, J., having disqualified him-
self, does not participate herein. 
The WESTERN CASUALTY AND 
SURETY COMPANY, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Ralph MARCHANT, Darve Miller, and 
Sherman Peterson, Defendants and 
Respondents. 
No. 16512. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
July 11, 1980. 
Automobile liability insurer, which 
claimed that injured employee was an em-
ployee of insured and thus excluded under 
3. Whtkms v. Simonds, 14 Utah 2d 406, 385 
P.2cJ 154 (1963). 
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sources of water supply owned or controlled 
by them, and all such assets must be pre-
served, maintained, and operated for sup-
plying its inhabitants with water at reason-
able charges. 
By statute,3 municipalities shall not be 
required to furnish water for use, even to 
its own inhabitants, unless an application 
therefor is made in writing and signed by 
the owner of the place to be served. The 
plaintiffs in this case have not made any 
application in writing or otherwise for 
water service, and Salt Lake City has nei-
ther agreed to furnish, nor furnished, any 
water to the plaintiffs or any of them. 
What the city can do and does is to sell its 
surplus water to water districts;4 and those 
districts in turn furnish water to residents 
who reside within the boundaries of the 
distnct. 
The fact that Salt Lake County and the 
various water conservancy districts therein 
permit their residents to depend upon the 
surplus water supplied by Salt Lake City is 
no reason to grant a judgment to these 
plaintiffs. Such a ruling will require Salt 
Lake City to continue to furnish them with 
water when the city no longer has a surplus 
to sell. It is, and should be, the responsibil-
ity of those who undertake to furnish water 
to their residents to secure water rights in 
their own names which they may do by 
purchase, through eminent domain proceed-
ings, or by digging wells. They cannot 
expect the courts to compel a city to sell 
water when it has none for sale or when it 
does not care to sell its surplus, if any it 
has The city commissioners are the ones to 
decide whether the city will or should sell 
water and that is not, and ought not to be, 
a matter of concern to the courts. 
I would remand this case with directions 
to the trial court to grant the Motion to 
Dismiss. No costs should be awarded to 
either party. 
Vw\ 
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Maxine L. MECHAM and the State of 
Utah, by and through Utah State De-
partment of Social Services, Plaintiffs 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Richard Lynn MECHAM, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
No. 14910. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sept. 28, 1977. 
Utah State Department of Social Serv-
ices brought action against husband for re-
imbursement of support furnished to wife 
and child. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, Bryant H. Croft, J., dismissed 
the action without prejudice to the Depart-
ment. The Supreme Court, Maughan, J., 
held that. (1) public support of children 
statute was not the proper procedure to 
modify a decree of divorce and (2) failure to 
plead for reimbursement of money expend-
ed in support of child and denial of past and 
present alimony was res judicata as to hus-
band's duty of support and Department of 
Social Services could not commence suit for 
funds paid to wife. 
Affirmed. 
Crockett, J., dissented and filed opinion 
in which Ellett, C. J., concurred. 
h Divorce <s=>309 
Where trial court determined the 
amount to be paid under duty of support, 
public support of children statute was not 
the proper procedure to modify a decree of 
divorce. U.C.A.1953, 78-45-1 et seq. 
2. Social Security and Public Welfare 
<s=>ll 
Department of Social Services has only 
the right to enforce the amount of support 
4. 10-8-14, U C A., 1953 as amended 
Utah Rep 564-572 P 2d—12 
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due from the obligee to obligor and Depart-
ment may not unilaterally determine that 
amount and then seek reimbursement. 
U.C.A.1953, 78-45-7. 
3. Divorce e=>255 
Where former wife had pleaded for 
temporary alimony and divorce decree de-
nied past and present alimony, divorce de-
cree was res judicata as to husband's duty 
to support former wife and Department of 
Social Services could not commence suit for 
funds paid to former wife. U.C.A.1953, 78-
45-7. 
4. Divorce <s=>308 
Where former wife pleaded for tempo-
rary child support but did not seek reim-
bursement of money expended for support 
of child, divorce decree was res judicata as 
to husband's duty to support child between 
filing of divorce action and entry of decree 
and Department of Social Services could 
not commence suit for funds paid to child 
prior to date of decree. U.C.A.1953, 78-45-
4. 
Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., Stephen G. 
Schwendiman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake 
City, for plaintiffs and appellant. 
Mark S. Miner, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendant and respondent. 
MAUGHAN, Justice: 
Before us is an order which dismissed 
plaintiff's complaint. The trial court cor-
rectly interpreted the law, and we sustain 
its judgment. 
Maxine L. Mecham filed a complaint for 
divorce on July 6, 1973. Defendant hus-
band, was served August 30, 1973. In the 
complaint, plaintiff sought temporary ali-
mony and child support. A decree of di-
vorce was entered March 15, 1974. The 
record does not indicate that plaintiff pur-
sued her demand for temporary alimony or 
support. The decree provided: 
The plaintiff is hereby ordered, ad-
judged and decreed to be denied any 
right whatsoever to alimony for the past 
the present or the future forevermore, as 
the rigjht to alimony is affected by the 
marital relationship existing between the 
parties I to this action. . . . 
. . . Both the plaintiff and de-
fendant are hereby ordered to assume 
and pay any and all debts incurred by 
themselves respectfully (sic) since the fil-
ing of the divorce complaint in this mat-
ter and to hold the other party free from 
harm thereon. 
The decree further ordered defendant to 
pay plaintiff $75 per month as child support 
for the parties' minor child. 
In August 1973, Maxine Mecham began 
receiving welfare payments from the De-
partment of Social Services for both herself 
and the child at the rate of $162.00 per 
month. She continued receiving these pay-
ments through September 1974. The De-
partment of Social Services filed a com-
plaint, which was served on March 5, 1975, 
pleading for reimbursement for the welfare 
payments made to Maxine Mecham. The 
department's claim was predicated on Sec-
tion 78-4&-9, U.C.A.1953, as amended 1975, 
which grants it- the right to proceed on 
behalf of the obligee to enforce the right of 
support against the obligor. 
The trial court dismissed the action with-
out prejudice to plaintiff's right to inter-
vene in the divorce action, so the depart-
ment might proceed to enforce any rights 
Maxine Hecham might have against Rich-
ard Mecham for nonpayment of the support 
ordered, and to the extent to which the 
state might be entitled under the divorce 
decree. 
However, in regard to the right of reim-
bursement for the sums paid in the interim 
between the filing of the divorce complaint 
and the entry of the decree, the trial court 
ruled: 
. . . There is a distinction to be 
drawn between the statutory 'duty* of 
support and the statutory proceedings un-
der which the amount of that support is 
to be fixed. If not otherwise fixed as in 
a divorce decree or a similar judgment, 
the amount to be paid by an obligor may 
be determined either by court proceed-
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ings under Chapter 45 [Title 78] or by 
administrative procedures under 45(b) 
[45b]. In either case the department may 
proceed on behalf of the obligee. But in 
neither case can the department proceed 
to get a judgment against one owing a 
duty of support for welfare handouts 
when there has been no prior determina-
tion of the amount of support to be paid, 
and particularity] where, as in the case 
before the court, there has been a decree 
of divorce previously entered fixing the 
amount of support and/or alimony to be 
paid. 
[1] The trial court in its ruling stated 
that in the decree of divorce entered on 
March 15, 1974, the court had ordered de-
fendant to pay Maxine Mecham $75.00 per 
month child support and that he should pay 
no alimony. The trial court ruled the di-
vorce decree fixed the amount to be paid 
under defendant's duty of support, and no 
further proceedings are required or allowed 
to otherwise change that determination, ex-
cept a petition to modify the divorce decree 
because of a change of circumstances. The 
trial court ruled that a complaint under 
Chapter 45 of Title 78 is not the proper 
procedure to modify a decree of divorce. 
We agree. 
[2] Under Chapter 45, Title 78, the duty 
of support of the obligor is to the obligee. 
The state department of Social Services has 
only the right to enforce the amount of 
support which is due the obligee from the 
obligor.1 The department may not unilat-
erally determine that amount and then en-
force the right of reimbursement by an 
action under Chapter 45. Under Chapter 
45, the district court determines the amount 
due for support, after considering the rele-
vant factors, some of which are specified in 
Section 78-45-7. 
1. Sec 78-45b-l et seq. was enacted in 1975 
and went into effect May 13, 1975 and Sec. 
78-45-9 was amended to its present form. At 
the time the department paid Maxine and the 
date the department filed its complaint. Sec. 
78-45-9, provided "The obligee may enforce 
his right of support against the obligor and the 
state department of [public welfare] may pro-
MECHAM Utah 125 
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[3,4] As to reimbursement for the sup-
port furnished to Maxine Mecham, the de-
partment's rights are derivative and no 
greater than Maxine's rights. In her com-
plaint, Maxine pleaded for temporary ali-
mony. In the decree, she was denied past 
and present alimony; defendant's duty of 
support was determined, and the matter is 
res judicata. The department cannot file a 
complaint one year after a court has deter-
mined the amount of support (in this case 
nothing), and demand reimbursement under 
Chapter 45. The same principle applies to 
the child support which accumulated prior 
to the date of the decree, March 15, 1974. 
Maxine had pleaded in her complaint for 
temporary child support; there was no pro-
vision made in the decree for any sum ex-
pended for the support of the child from 
August 1973 to March 15, 1974. Maxine 
also had a duty to support the child, Section 
78-45-4. Under the decree, she was or-
dered to assume and pay any and all debts 
she had incurred since the filing of the 
complaint and to hold her husband harm-
less. Maxine did not seek in the decree any 
sum for reimbursement for the money she 
had expended for the support of the child, 
although she had put the matter in issue in 
her pleading. The rights of the department 
are derived through Maxine—the matter is 
res judicata. 
WILKINS, and HALL, JJ., concur. 
CROCKETT, Justice (dissenting). 
It is important to bear in mind that this 
is not a suit in which the Department of 
Social Services joined with the plaintiff in a 
divorce action. It is one in which the De-
partment brought its own and separate ac-
tion for reimbursement for reasonable sup-
port it had furnished to the defendant's 
family in necessitous circumstances. What-
ever rights it has and asserts in its own 
ceed on behalf of the obligee to enforce his 
right of support against the obligor. Whenever 
the state department of welfare furnishes sup-
port to an obligee, it has the same nght as the 
obligee to whom the support was furnished, for 
the purpose of securing reimbursement and of 
obtaining continuing support. . . ." 
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separate action should not be in any way 
dependent upon nor adversely affected by 
any determination made in the divorce ac-
tion, to which it was not a party; likewise, 
the adjudication of any issue in the other 
action is not res judicata in this action.1 
The issue involved here is the right of the 
Department to reimbursement for support 
furnished the wife, Maxine Mecham, during 
the time of the marriage and prior to the 
granting of the divorce. (Inasmuch as the 
defendants duty to support her was termi-
nated by the divorce decree on March 15, 
1974, no contention is made of the Depart-
ment's entitlement to reimbursement from 
defendant for support furnished after that 
date.) 
It is so plain as to be uncontestable that 
under the common law the husband and 
father always had a duty to support his 
family, both his wife and children;2 and 
that under our statutory law, both husband 
and wife have a duty to support each other 
and their children.3 It is also well estab-
lished that where such dependents are left 
in hunger, or in want of the necessities of 
life, anyone who comes to their rescue and 
supplies their needs has a right to reim-
bursement from the one who had the legal 
duty of support.4 Therefore, the Depart-
ment or anyone else who so comes to the 
rescue should be able to furnish necessities 
and seek reimbursement therefore.5 
1. 60 A.L.R.2d at 59. 
2. Rees v Archibald, 6 Utah 2d 264, 311 P2d 
788 (1957); State Division of Family Services 
v. Clark, Utah, 554 P 2d 1310 (1976), Barrett v. 
Barrett, 44 Anz. 509, 39 P 2d 621 (1934), 67 
C.J.S. Parent and Child § 15; 41 CJ.S. Hus-
band and Wife § 15. 
3. Sec. 30-2-9, U.C.A.1953, Sections 78-45-3 
and 4, U.C.A.1953 
4. See Sec. 78-45-9, U C.A.1953 (Pocket Supp); 
and also Sec. 78-45b-3, which provides: "De-
partment of social services—Powers and 
duties.—(1) In the event that assistance is fur-
nished by the department, the department shall 
become trustee of any cause of action of the 
obligee or any minor child in that obligee's 
custody, to recover support due to that obligee 
from any person and may bring and maintain 
the action either in its own name or in the 
name of the obligee." (Emphasis added), and 
see Baggs v. Anderson, Utah, 528 P2d 141; 
It Mso should be borne in mind that the 
purpdse of the Uniform Civil Liability for 
Support Act6 was to provide a means for 
compelling those responsible to support 
their families. Particularly Section 78-
45-91 was intended to increase and facili-
tate the ability of the Department to com-
pel stich support by obtaining reimburse-
ment for support it had furnished. There is 
nothing in the language of the statute 
which indicates or intimates an intent to 
abrogate or diminish the Department's abil-
ity to accomplish that objective. On the 
contrary, both its purpose and its permis-
sive language made it abundantly clear that 
the statute was not intended to limit or 
curtail the already existing right of reim-
bursement. This is expressly set forth in 
Section 7&-45-12 which provides: "The 
rights herein created are in addition to and 
not in substitution to any other right" 
[Emphasis added.] 
The above-cited rules of statutory and 
decisional law relating to the duty of the 
father to support his family and the right 
of one who supplies necessities to seek reim-
bursement from him arise out of social ne-
cessity and sound public policy. If rescuers 
could not seek reimbursement, they would 
be discouraged from doing so and families 
may be left in dire need. 
State\Division of Family Services v. Clark, su-
pra; Strafford v Field, 70 Idaho 331, 218 P2d 
338 (1950), West v West, 114 Okl. 279, 246 P 
599 (1926); Rogers v. Rogers, 93 Kan. 114, 143 
P. 410 (1914); 41 CJ.S. Husband and Wife 
§ 50, 67 CJ.S. Parent and Child § 16. 
5. "A public authority that has supported a wife 
living apart from her husband has a common 
law rejmedy against the husband . The 
rule applies to support furnished to her as 
public assistance." 41 Am.Jur.2d, Husband 
and Wife, Sec. 350. See also 60 A.L.R.2d 7 
6. Chap. 110, SL.U 1957, now in our code as 
Sec. 78-45-1 et seq, U.C.A.1953. 
7. ". i, . t h e state department of social serv-
ices may proceed pursuant to this act or any 
other applicable statute, either on its own be-
half or on behalf of the obligee, to enforce the 
obligee's right of support against the obligor " 
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Reflection will reveal the incongruity and 
impracticality of ruling otherwise. Suppose 
that because of independent wealth or in-
come of a plaintiff mother, or by collusion 
or whatever cause, the court should decree 
in the divorce proceeding that the father 
should pay only $1 per year, or any other 
nominal award, for support of his wife, or 
of his child. Suppose further that condi-
tions change and the latter become in hun-
ger or want; and further, the Department 
Cor anyone else) provided support to the 
extent of any amount that proved to be 
reasonable and necessary. It is conceivable 
that anyone would argue that the rescuer 
could only be reimbursed to the extent of $1 
per month, because it was so determined in 
a divorce proceeding, to which the rescuer 
was not a party. It is submitted that the 
only answer comfortable to law, logic and 
justice is that the rescuer could proceed as 
expressly authorized under Section 78-45-9 
to seek reimbursement for necessities it had 
furnished. The defendant father would of 
course be entitled to appear and defend and 
would be liable only for whatever was 
shown to be reasonable and necessary. 
There is the further aspect of this prob-
lem to be considered. If the rescuer who 
has furnished necessities (in this instance 
the Department) can have his rights affect-
ed or cut off in the divorce proceeding, a 
high likelihood is that that will be done. 
The wife would have no incentive to seek 
an award for past support money. She 
wouid have been supported by the rescuer, 
(the Department); and any payments for 
past support that she was to receive would 
go to reimburse the Department, with no 
benefit to her. But since she may have the 
right to recover for such back support, she 
could propose to forego her claim to it in 
the divorce action in return for some other 
benefit. The result of this is that the par-
ties could cheat the department out of its 
right to reimbursement, without the De-
partment being a party'to, represented in, 
or having anything to say about such collu-
sion. 
What has been said above confirms the 
reasoning that what happens in the divorce 
proceeding should not and could not proper-
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ly have any adverse effect upon rights 
which had already been acquired by the 
Department during the time of the mar-
riage and up to the time of the divorce. As 
above indicated, it is of course different 
after the divorce is granted and the defend-
ant no longer has any duty to support the 
wife. 
On the basis of what has been said here-
in, it is my opinion that the trial court 
improperly dismissed this action and that 
the defendant and the Department are enti-
tled to a trial on the issues as to whether 
and how much it was reasonably required 
to furnish support to Mrs. Mecham when 
the defendant was responsible for her sup-
port, i. e., during the marriage and prior to 
the entry of the divorce decree. 
I would remand for that purpose. 
ELLETT, C. J., concurs in the dissenting 
opinion of CROCKETT, J. 
Leora M. GULLEY and the State of Utah, 
By and Through Utah State Department 
of Social Services, Plaintiffs and Appel-
lants, 
v. 
Guy M. GULLEY, Defendant 
and Respondent 
No. 14789. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sept 30, 1977. 
State Department of Social Services 
appealed from an order of the Third Dis-
trict Court, Salt Lake County, Bryant H. 
Croft, J., dismissing its petition for reim-
bursement for support furnished to the chil-
dren and former wife of defendant The 
Supreme Court, Crockett, J., held that: an 
ROBERTS v. 
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sequently, notwithstanding the purported 
declaration of termination filed on behalf of 
Betty N. Nelson, the joint tenancy owner-
ship with her husband, plaintiff Douglas 
Nelson continued to exist until her death, 
and then vested in him as the survivor. 
[4] The facts are undisputed that de-
fendant Michelle Davis knew that the home 
in question was an asset of the marital 
estate being dealt with in the divorce ac-
tion; and that she knew of the interdiction 
against it being conveyed or transferred 
until the court's adjudication concerning it. 
Consequently, because of that actual knowl-
edge, any interest she may have acquired 
by the quit claim deed, was subject to the 
disposition of the property to be made in 
that action. 
[5] Consistent with and further support-
ive of the determination made by the trial 
court is its finding that there was "no evi-
dence of delivery" to the defendant of her 
mother's quit claim deed, which would be 
essential to its vesting of any interest in 
her.3 
We say what we have said herein ad-
visedly, notwithstanding defendant's con-
tention that the order of November 4,1976, 
that her mother "may convert the joint 
tenancy to a tenancy in common" became 
res judicata because that order was never 
appealed from. From what has been said 
above it is obvious that there was never any 
such conversion of the joint tenancy to a 
tenancy in common, either by the purported 
declaration of termination of joint tenancy, 
or by the abortive attempt to deed the 
property to defendant Michelle Davis. 
[6] Defendant's alternative contention 
is that, even if she does not take by the 
deed, she should be entitled to succeed to 
her mother's interest in the property as the 
executrix of her estate and her heir. As 
has been explained above, upon the death of 
her mother, plaintiff became the owner of 
the home as the surviving joint tenant, just 
3. Givan v Lambeth, 10 Utah 2d 287, 351 P2d 
959 
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the same as defendant's mother would have 
done ii she had survived her husband. In 
regard to any rights in the property that 
her mother may have acquired in the di-
vorce action, the principle announced by 
this Court in the case of Daly v. Daly* is 
applicable: that when the death of one or 
both parties to a divorce action occurs dur-
ing th|e pendency of the action, the action 
itself abates and their status, including 
their property rights, reverts to what it had 
been before the action was filed. 
On the basis of the discussion herein, it is 
our conclusion that the defendant has failed 
to disbharge the burden which is hers of 
demonstrating that the court committed er-
ror w,hich would justify reversal of the 
judgment5 
Affirmed. Costs to plaintiff (respon-
dent), 
MAUGHAN, WILKINS, HALL and 
STEWART, JJ., concur. 
( O I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM^ 
Debbrah Kim ROBERTS, and the State of 
Utah, By and Through Utah State De-
partment of Social Services, Plaintiffs 
an^ l Appellants, 
v. 
Robert Glen ROBERTS, Defendant 
and Respondent 
No. 15546. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 6, 1979. 
State, through Department of Social 
Services, sought reimbursement of funds 
paid for support of divorced parties' minor 
5. See Charlton v. HacketU 11 Utah 2d 389, 360 
P2d 176. 
4. Utah, 533 P.2d 884. 
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child prior to their divorce. The Fourth 
District Court, Utah County, George E. Bal-
lif, J., denied reimbursement and state ap-
pealed. The Supreme Court, Maughan, J., 
held that state, which was made party to 
divorce action before court's order fixing 
amount of child support to be paid by hus-
band, was entitled to reimbursement of 
funds expended for support of such child 
prior to child support order to extent of 
husband's support obligations. 
Affirmed in part; reversed in part. 
Crockett, C. J., filed opinion in which 
he concurred in the result. 
Hall and Stewart, JJ., concurred in re-
sult 
Social Security and Public Welfare 
<s=> 194.19 
State, which was made party to divorce 
action before court's order fixing amount of 
child support to be paid by husband, was 
entitled to reimbursement of funds expend-
ed for support of such child prior to child 
support order to extent of husband's sup-
port obligations. (Per Maughan, J., with one 
Justice concurring and three Justices con-
curring in the result.) U.C.A.1953, 78-45-7 
(3), 78-45-9. 
Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., Salt Lake 
City, Ray E. Gammon, Deputy County 
Atty., Utah County, Provo, for the State. 
Maxwell A. Miller, Provo, for Deborah 
Roberts. 
Ronald R. Stanger, Provo, for defendant 
and respondent. 
MAUGHAN, Justice: 
This is an action by the State of Utah, 
through the State Department of Social 
Services for reimbursement of sums paid 
for the support of the minor child of Debo-
rah and Robert Roberts prior to their di-
vorce. The district court denied reimburse-
ment on the basis of Mecham v. Mecham, 
Utah, 570 P.2d 123 (1977). We affirm in 
part and reverse in part. All statutory 
references are to U.C.A.1953, as amended. 
The parties stipulated to the facts in this 
case, which are as follows. Plaintiff Debo-
rah Roberts filed an action for divorce on 
July 11, 1977. She thereafter sought and 
received public assistance payments during 
August, September and October, 1977, 
amounting to $166 per month for the sup-
port of the minor child of plaintiff and 
defendant. On October 12, 1977, the di-
vorce action was heard in the district court, 
but the matter of child support was re-
served for hearing on October 25. The 
Utah State Department of Social Services 
filed a motion for joinder under Rule 19, 
and pursuant to a stipulation by the parties 
in open court on October 25, the court 
granted the motion to join the State as a 
plaintiff. The State asserts it is entitled to 
reimbursement for sums paid to defendant 
on behalf of the minor child prior to the 
entry of the court's order fixing the amount 
of child support to be paid defendant. 
Defendant contends the State cannot be 
reimbursed for any sums paid before the 
entry of a court order fixing the amount of 
support money to be paid by defendant. 
All parties stipulated that if the State is 
entitled to reimbursement, the amount per 
month would be limited to the amount per 
month fixed by the district court as child 
support. 
The trial court ordered defendant to pay 
$110 per month as child support, beginning 
in November of 1977, and held that, based 
upon Mecham v. Mecham, supra, the De-
partment of Social Services was not entitled 
to any reimbursement for sums paid before 
the entry of the order. 
Mecham v. Mecham involved a suit by the 
Department of Social Services, pursuant to 
78-45-9, for assistance payments made to 
the wife for herself and a child. The pay-
ments were made both before and after the 
entry of the divorce decree on March 15, 
1974. The decree denied any alimony to the 
wife, and ordered the husband to pay $75 
per month prospective child support. We 
held the Department's right to reimburse-
ment was no greater than the wife's right 
to support, and thus it could not begin an 
ROBERTS v. 
Cite as 592 
action, after the entry of the decree fixing 
the alimony and child support to be paid, 
and seek amounts in excess of those provid-
ed for by the court. The Department was 
therefore prevented from obtaining any re-
imbursement for payments made to the 
wife, since no alimony was awarded by the 
court; no reimbursement was allowed for 
payments made on behalf of the child be-
fore the entry of the decree because the 
decree made no such provision. 
Mecham does not prevent the State from 
ever obtaining reimbursement for sums ex-
pended by the State prior to a court decree. 
Rather, it merely holds the State's right to 
reimbursement is derivative of the person 
entitled to support, and is limited to the 
amount of support fixed by a court. Be-
cause the district court assessed no child 
support payments against defendant until 
after the effective date of the decree, the 
State was not entitled to reimbursement for 
those sums expended for the child before 
the decree. 
In 1977, the Legislature added 78-45-
7(3), which reads: 
(3) When no prior court order exists, 
the court shall determine and assess all 
arrearages based upon, but not limited to: 
(a) The amount of public assistance re-
ceived by the obligee, if any; 
(b) The funds that have been reason-
ably and necessarily expended in sup-
port of spouse and children. 
This amendment indicates an intent by the 
Legislature that the State be allowed to 
recover all sums expended by the State on 
behalf of an obligee spouse and children 
prior to a court order. Here, the State was 
made a party before the court's order fixing 
the amount of child support to be paid, and 
should be reimbursed for sums expended on 
behalf of the child. 
However, the above amendment would 
constitute a denial of due process to the 
obligor spouse if the court assessed the obli-
gor for all public assistance benefits re-
ceived by the obligee, without considering 
relevant factors such as the relative wealth 
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and income of the parties; and the ability 
of the parties to earn income. Under 78-
45-7(2), seven such factors are required to 
be considered in determining the amount of 
prospective support. Under the Public Sup-
port of Children Act,1 which provides an 
administrative procedure for obtaining re-
imbursement for assistance payments made 
on behalf of minor children, similar factors 
must be considered in the hearing to deter-
mine th4 extent of the parent's liability for 
child subport.2 The assessment of arrear-
ages under 78-45-7(3) must also be subject 
to a consideration of the same factors. 
In thijs case, the district court, after con-
sideration of the factors in 78-45-7(2), de-
termined the amount of support to be $110 
per mopth; the State is therefore to be 
reimbursed by defendant in that amount 
for assistance provided from August 
through October, 1977. 
WILKINS, J., concurs. 
HALL and STEWART, JJ., concur in re-
sult. 
CRdCKETT, Chief Justice (concurring in 
result)* 
I agfee that the court having determined 
the reasonable and proper amount of sup-
port to be $110 per month, that is the 
amount for which the State Department of 
Social Services should be reimbursed in this 
case. However, I cannot agree with the 
proposition that "the state's right to reim-
bursement is derivative of the person enti-
tled to support." Section 78-45-7(3) enact-
ed in 11977 referred to in the main opinion 
does iot so indicate. That statute, and the 
main opinion which recognizes the change 
in th0 law, both impress me as a commenda-
ble improvement over the law as declared in 
the Mecham case, which the opinion cites. 
But |t is obvious that the intent and pur-
pose |of that statute was to supplement the 
right1 of the State to recover for support 
furnished to dependents, and not to any 
way |limit or diminish it. 
1. 78-45b-l et seq. 2. 7$-45b-6(2). 
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It is my opinion that the following propo-
sition is incontrovertibly supported by law, 
logic and justice: that whenever depend-
ents are left in necessitous circumstances, 
anyone who comes to their rescue (including 
the State Department of Social Services) 
has the right to reimbursement from the 
one who had the legal duty of support; and 
therefore the Department, or anyone else 
who so comes to rescue, should be able to 
furnish things which are reasonable and 
necessary for the sustenance of such a de-
pendent and to obtain reimbursement 
therefor; and that this is true whether 
furnished before or after a decree of di-
vorce and irrespective of whether there is 
one or not and without necessarily being 
bound by any adjudication to which the 
furnisher was not a party. See discussion 
and authorities cited in the dissent in the 
Mecham case. 
fa | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM^ 
Richard Michael ROSS, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Carol Dee ROSS, Defendant 
and Respondent, 
and 
Utah State Department of Social 
Services, Intervenor. 
Nos. 15800, 15830. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 9, 1979. 
Ex-husband brought suit to modify 
California divorce decree, and ex-wife coun-
terclaimed for accrued but unpaid alimony 
and child support. The bureau of recovery 
services intervened seeking reimbursement 
from plaintiff for assistance payments 
made to his ex-wife. The Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, David B. Dee, J., 
rendered judgment awarding $24,457 to ex-
wife, $1,544 to the state, and plaintiff ap-
pealed. On cross appeal, wife sought rever-
sal of that part of the judgment granting 
ex-husband a credit against accrued alimo-
ny. The Supreme Court, Wilkins, J., held 
that: (1) no evidence was presented that 
ex-wife or the bureau of recovery services 
made implicit or explicit statements on 
which ex-husband could reasonably rely to 
the effect that accrued but unpaid support 
payments were waived; nor was ex-hus-
band misled by ex-wife's conduct in at-
tempting a reconciliation; accordingly, 
there was no waiver or acquiescence, and 
the principles of equitable estoppel did not 
apply; (2) ex-husband was not entitled to 
credit for expenditures made on behalf of 
the children or his ex-wife which did not 
specifically conform to the terms of the 
divorce decree, and (3) alimony and child 
support which accrued during the time the 
parties and their children lived together in 
a good faith yet unsuccessful attempt at 
reconciliation would not be abated, as the 
evidence failed to establish that the ex-hus-
band supported his family during the recon-
ciliation period. 
Affirmed on appeal; reversed on cross 
appeal. 
1. Appeal and Error <s=*893(2), 895(2) 
In an equitable proceeding, it is the 
prerogative of the Supreme Court to review 
the facts as well as the law, but it does not 
overturn the district court's findings unless 
the evidence clearly preponderates against 
them. Const, art. 8, § 9. 
2. Divorce <e=>311.5 
No evidence was presented that ex-
wife or the bureau of recovery services 
made implicit or explicit statements on 
which ex-husband could reasonably rely to 
the effect that accrued but unpaid support 
payments were waived; nor was ex-hus-
band misled by ex-wife's conduct in at-
tempting a reconciliation; accordingly, 
there was no waiver or acquiescence, and 
the principles of equitable estoppel did not 
apply. 
